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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Luke Alan Walsh appeals from the judgment entered upon his guilty plea 
to conspiracy to violate the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. He argues that 
the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept the plea. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Gooding County law enforcement officers stopped Jordan Dunn's vehicle 
after Dunn failed to meet with his probation officer. (PSI, p.2.) In a search of the 
vehicle, officers recovered Dunn's cell phone, which contained a text message 
from "LAW" asking "What you got[?]" (Id.) Deputy Alex Boyer used Dunn's 
phone to respond to the text message and make arrangements to sell .5 grams 
of cocaine to "LAW" for $40, in the parking lot of a church in Wendell, Idaho. (Id.) 
Officers maintained communication with "LAW" and then conducted a 
traffic stop on a truck that passed the church and turned around. (PSI, p.2.) The 
passenger of the truck was identified as Luke Walsh. (Id.) Deputy Boyer 
removed Walsh from the truck and observed him place a cell phone down. (Id.) 
Deputy Boyer retrieved the phone, which he identified as the source of the "LAW" 
text messages. (Id.) Officers arrested Walsh and found $40 on his person. (Id.) 
Walsh admitted that he had David Thompson, the driver of the truck, take him to 
Wendell so that he could purchase cocaine from Dunn. (Id.) 
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The state charged Walsh with conspiracy to violate the Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act. 1 (R., pp.11-13.) Pursuant to plea agreement, Walsh pied guilty 
to the charge, and the state agreed to recommend that Walsh be referred to drug 
court. (Tr., p.5, L.22 - p.20, L.16.) The district court accepted Walsh's plea and 
directed the clerk to fax the referral to the drug court coordinator. (Tr., p.20, 
Ls.12-24.) Less than a month later, Walsh was terminated from drug court for 
absconding before he completed the program's entrance requirements. (R., 
pp.16-18.) Walsh turned himself in after a warrant was issued for his arrest. 
(PSI, p.4.) 
Before he could be sentenced, Walsh filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea pursuant to I.C.R. 33(c). (R., pp.20-21.) Walsh argued that the district court 
should allow him to withdraw his plea because a communication between a 
private citizen and an undercover law enforcement officer could not constitute 
criminal conspiracy as a matter of law. (Tr., p.23, L.22 - p.43, L.24.) At the 
hearing on the motion, Walsh acknowledged that both he and his counsel were 
1 The information and judgment of conviction reference I.C. § 18-1701, the 
general Idaho conspiracy statute, rather than I.C. § 37-2732(f), the conspiracy 
statute specific to the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. (R., pp.12, 34.) The 
judgment of conviction also references LC. § 37-2732(a)(1)(B), the subsection of 
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act that prohibits the manufacture, delivery, 
or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a nonnarcotic schedule I or II 
controlled substance, a crime which carries a maximum sentence of five years. 
(R., p.34.) This may be a clerical error. In light of the facts of the case, and the 
district court's references to a 7-year maximum sentence in the judgment of 
conviction and during the entry of plea hearing (R., p.34; Tr., p.4, Ls.17-23), 
Walsh may have been convicted of conspiracy to violate I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), the 
subsection that prohibits possession of a schedule I or II controlled substance 
without a prescription, a crime which carries a maximum sentence of seven 
years. 
2 
aware at the time of his guilty plea that it was Deputy Boyer who arranged the 
cocaine transaction with Walsh. (Tr., p.23, L.22 - p.24, L 10.) Walsh and his 
counsel also indicated that while they were aware of potential defenses to the 
charge before he entered his plea, Walsh chose to plead guilty to take advantage 
of the offer of drug court. (R., p.23; Tr., p.23, L.22 - p.24, L.10.) 
The district court denied Walsh's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Tr., 
p.43, L.25 - p.50, L.9.) The court first recognized that Walsh's plea was 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. (Id.) The court then found that Walsh's 
desire to assert a legaf defense after he pied guilty to the crime, and after he was 
terminated from drug court, did not constitute "just cause" to withdraw his guilty 
plea, particularly considering that Walsh was aware of the pertinent facts of the 
case, and potential defenses to the charge, prior to his plea. (Id.) The district 
court imposed a unified four-year sentence with one year fixed, but retained 
jurisdiction. (R., pp.33-39.) Walsh timely appealed. (R., pp.40-43.) 
3 
ISSUES 
Walsh states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. 
Walsh's motion to withdraw his guilty plea as he presented a "just 
reason" and the State conceded that it would not have been 
prejudiced if Mr. Walsh had been allowed to withdraw his guilty 
plea? 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Walsh failed to show the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea? 
2. Has Walsh failed to show the district court lacked subject matter 




Walsh Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying 
His Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Walsh contends the district court abused its discretion by denying his pre-
sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-14.) 
Specifically, he argues that the district court erred in denying his motion because 
the facts asserted by the state and admitted by Walsh do not constitute criminal 
conspiracy as a matter of law. (Id.) However, a review of the record and the 
applicable law supports the district court's determination that Walsh failed to 
carry his burden of establishing either that his plea was involuntary, or that there 
existed any other just reason entitling him to withdraw his plea. Walsh has thus 
failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished 
from arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 
775, 780-781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 
P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's 
factual findings if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. 
Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 
869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994). 
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C. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Denying Walsh's Motion 
To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be made before sentence is 
imposed. I.C.R. 33(c). The presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an 
automatic right, however. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 
284 (1990); Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780. The defendant bears 
the burden of proving, in the district court, that the plea should be withdrawn. &; 
Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 374-75, 825 P.2d 94, 97-98 (Ct. App. 1992). 
In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the district court must 
determine, as a threshold matter, whether the plea was entered knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily. State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 
111 (1991); Hanslovan, 121 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781; State v. Rodriguez, 
118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990). If the plea was 
voluntary, in the constitutional sense, then the court must determine whether 
other reasons exist to allow the defendant to withdraw the plea. Hanslovan, 121 
Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781. The decision to grant or deny a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court. & at 535, 211 
P.3d at 780. 
Where the defendant moves to withdraw his guilty plea before the 
imposition of sentence "but after [he] has read his presentence report or received 
other information about his probable sentence, the court is to exercise broad 
discretion, but may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent 
motive." State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408,411, 816 P.2d 364, 366 (Ct. App. 
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1991) (citation omitted). "[T]he good faith, credibility, and weight of the 
defendant's assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters 
for the trial court to decide." Hansolvan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d at 782. 
In this case, the district court denied Walsh's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea after first properly concluding that Walsh's plea was knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent.2 (Tr., p.43, L.25 - p.50, L.9.) At Walsh's change of plea hearing, the 
district court engaged Walsh in an extensive and careful plea colloquy, at which 
Walsh acknowledged, among other things, that he understood the elements of 
the crime of conspiracy to violate the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, that he 
understood he was waiving his right to a jury trial, and that he had reviewed all of 
the state-provided discovery with his attorney. (Tr., p.7, L.9 - p.20, L.11.) Prior 
to the entry of his guilty plea, Walsh and his counsel also indicated that they were 
specifically aware that it was Deputy Boyer who used Jordan Dunn's cell phone 
to arrange a cocaine sale with Walsh: 
COURT: And why is it you say you're guilty? 
2 On appeal, Walsh does not dispute that his plea was voluntary, except "[t]o the 
extent to which Mr. Walsh was charged with conspiring to violate the Uniform 
Controlled Substances Act with Mr. Thompson" (the individual who drove Walsh 
to Wendell to purchase the cocaine), instead of with Deputy Boyer. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.12-14.) At the hearing on Walsh's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the 
district court raised the possibility that Walsh may have committed conspiracy not 
only with Deputy Boyer, but with Thompson as well. (Tr., p.26, Ls.3-4.) The 
state then also discussed this possibility. (Tr., p.27, L.16 - p.30, L.11.) These 
post-plea discussions have no bearing on the validity of Walsh's plea at the time 
he made it. Had Walsh challenged the charging document or pursued a defense 
to the charge prior to entering his guilty plea, the state may have chosen to 
amend the information to specifically allege that Walsh conspired with 







I tried to purchase cocaine through my phone text 
messages. 
Okay. 
It's all there. 
And did you also make arrangements with Mr. Dunn to meet 
him at the LOS Church to complete the transaction? 
That's - I thought it was him. 
COUNSEL: Your Honor, this was done by a police officer's texting on the 
other end so technically it wasn't Mr. Dunn. 
(Tr., p.19, L.15 - p.20, L.3.) 
At the hearing on Walsh's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Walsh then 
argued that "just cause" existed for the district court to withdraw his plea 
because, as a matter of law, a defendant may not be convicted of conspiring with 
an undercover law enforcement officer. (Tr., p.24, L.17 - p.25, L.1 O; Appellant's 
brief, pp.7-14); see United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 
1984) (holding that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that if it 
determined that the defendant only "conspired" with an undercover government 
agent, it could not find the defendant guilty of violating the federal conspiracy 
statute). 
Whether, under the facts of this case, Walsh could be convicted of 
conspiring with an undercover police officer under the Idaho conspiracy statute is 
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a potential defense to the charge.3 The nature of the defense, essentially, is that 
Walsh's actions did not constitute criminal conspiracy under Idaho law. Walsh 
could have asserted this defense either through a motion to dismiss the charge, 
or by requiring the state to prove that he committed the crime of conspiracy to 
violate the Uniform Controlled Substances Act at a trial. Instead, as the district 
court correctly recognized (Tr., p.43, L.25 - p.50, L.9), Walsh knowingly waived 
all factual and legal defenses by pleading guilty. See State v. Coffin, 104 Idaho 
543, 546, 661 P.3d 328, 331 (1983). 
The district court then properly considered Walsh's asserted "just cause" 
to withdraw his guilty plea in the context of Walsh's apparent motives in pleading 
guilty to the charge and later seeking to withdraw the guilty plea. (Tr., p.43, L.25 
- p.50, L.9); see State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 
2004); Johnson, 120 Idaho at 411, 816 P.2d at 366 (a district court "may temper 
its liberality" in considering a motion to withdraw a guilty plea where the 
defendant makes the motion after receiving information about his probable 
sentence.) Walsh was aware of potential defenses to the charge prior to entering 
his plea, and his attorney even "doubted that a crime had taken place," but Walsh 
3 It would not necessarily be a successful defense, however, as the present case 
is distinguishable from Escobar de Bright. In support of its holding in that case, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that, "[a]llowing a government agent 
to form a conspiracy with only one other party would create the potential for law 
enforcement officers to 'manufacture' conspiracies when none would exist absent 
the government's presence." Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d at 1200. In the 
present case, Deputy Boyer did not create or manufacture a conspiracy, she 
covertly assumed the identity of an individual who may have already been 
engaged in a conspiracy with Walsh. The state was relieved from proving as 
much when Walsh pied guilty to the charge. 
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still elected to plead guilty because "he wanted the drug court." (R., p.23; Tr., 
p.23, L.22 - p.24, L.10.) It was only after Walsh absconded from drug court, was 
terminated from that program, and thus "receiv[ed] information about his 
probable sentence" (i.e. that he would not be able to participate in drug court), 
that Walsh attempted to assert a defense he previously waived by pleading guilty 
to the charge. The district court acted well within its discretion in denying 
Walsh's motion under these circumstances. 
The record supports the district court's determination that Walsh failed to 
carry his burden of establishing either that his plea was involuntary or that there 
existed any other just cause for withdrawal of the plea. Walsh has thus failed to 
show an abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea. 
II. 
Walsh Has Failed To Show The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Accept His 
Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Walsh contends that the information charging him with conspiracy to 
violate the Uniform Controlled Substances Act failed to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction on the district court, and that the district court erred when it accepted 
Walsh's guilty plea to the crime. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-12.) However, a review 
of the record reveals that the charging information properly conferred subject 
matter jurisdiction on the court. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a charging document conforms to the requirements of the law is 
a question over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Jones, 
140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004); State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 285, 
287, 805 P.2d 491, 493 (Ct. App. 1991 ). 
C. The District Court Had Jurisdiction To Accept Walsh's Guilty Plea 
"The information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was 
committed within the state of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the 
court." State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1133 (2004) (citing 
State v. Slater, 71 Idaho 335, 338, 231 P.2d 424, 425 (1951 )). When, as in this 
case, an objection to the information was not timely raised before trial or the 
entry of a guilty plea, the sufficiency of the charging document will "be upheld 
unless it is so defective that it does not, by any fair or reasonable construction, 
charge an offense for which the defendant is convicted." Jones, 140 Idaho at 
759, 101 at 703. A reviewing court has considerable leeway "to imply the 
necessary allegations from the language of the information." Robran, 119 Idaho 
at 287, 805 P.2d at 493. Specifically, an information will confer jurisdiction if it 
"contains a statement of the territorial jurisdiction of the court and a citation to the 
applicable section of the Idaho Code." State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 622, 
115 P.3d 710, 713 (2005). Other challenges to an information, such as that it 
failed to include adequate factual specificity, are waived by a defendant's failure 
to raise these matters before his guilty plea or the entry of judgment. Jones, 140 
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Idaho at 758-7599, 101 at 702-703; I.C.R. 12(b)(2). Application of these legal 
principles to the facts of this case shows that the information conferred 
jurisdiction on the district court. 
The information cited the statutes applicable to conspiracy (R., p.12 (citing 
I.C. § 18-1701)), and the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (R., p.12 (citing 
I.C. § 37-2732)), and also alleged that the offense was committed in Gooding 
County, Idaho (R., p.12.) The information additionally alleged that Walsh "did 
willfully and knowingly combine, conspire, confederate, and agree with another 
person to possess a controlled substance, to-wit: Cocaine, a Schedule 11 
controlled substance." (Id.) Finally, the information alleged two overt acts Walsh 
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy - texting Jordan Dunn's cell phone to 
make arrangements to purchase cocaine, and traveling to the prearranged 
location to purchase the cocaine. (Id.) 
On appeal, Walsh asserts that the information failed to confer subject 
matter jurisdiction because it "fail[ed] to charge an offense" in light of the legal 
principle discussed in Escobar de Bright that a defendant does not commit 
federal criminal conspiracy by "conspiring" with an undercover law enforcement 
officer. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-12.) However, as discussed above, Escobar de 
Bright and similar cases merely present the possibility of a legal defense to the 
Idaho conspiracy charge. Whether Walsh had a defense is irrelevant to whether 
the charging document was adequate to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the 
court. 
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In addition, Walsh's jurisdictional challenge fails because he relies on 
facts not expressly alleged in the information, specifically, the identity of the co-
conspirator. (See R., pp.11-13.) Walsh has not argued that the information is, 
on its face, jurisdictionally defective, and he has waived all non-jurisdictional 
defects by pleading guilty to the charge. Jones, 140 Idaho at 758-7599, 101 at 
702-703; !.C.R. 12(b)(2). 
Because the information alleged that Walsh committed a criminal offense 
in the state of Idaho, the information alleged all the facts necessary to establish 
jurisdiction under the rules applicable to informations and indictments. Quintero, 
141 Idaho at 622, 115 P.3d at 713; Jones, 140 Idaho at 757-758, 101 P.3d at 
701-702. This Court should thus affirm Walsh's conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
denial of Walsh's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and his conviction for 
conspiracy to violate the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. 
DATED this 24th day of May 2012. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 24th day of May 2012, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
MWO/pm 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney Genera I 
14 
